Overskriften lyder mÃ¥ske lidt sær; vil jeg gerne medgive. Den kommer sig af, at jeg har fÃ¥et læst to særdels public choise-blogindlæg, som pÃ¥ deres helt egen — lidt fra vores virkelighed fjerne — mÃ¥de sætter systemet med magtens tredeling i relief og ser pÃ¥ hele ledelses/lovgivningssystemet igennem markedsøkonomiens briller:
I det første blogindlæg, Market power in the appointment process, sammenligner man den magt på markedet for udnævnelser, som den amerikanske præsident henholdsvis kongressen og det partipolitiske system har. Her i uddrag:
In making appointments the President has a good deal of power to appoint who he wants, even though his appointments must be confirmed by the Senate. The President has appointment market power because as the sole supplier of appointment nominations, the president faces almost no competition or potential competition. The presidential term is long, and there is only one of him. This is especially true in the President’s second term because he cannot be re-elected and so has little incentive to please voters. In contrast, Senators face competition in supplying votes for confirmation, and face at least some electoral competition.
Because American parties are strong, there is some degree of market power in the Senate, but it is not unbreakable because the party structures can only exert limited pressure on Senators. Senators can and do defy their party. Additionally, I suspect that the Senate actively blocking appointments is much more visible to the public than the president submitting extreme nominations, which makes it easier for the Senate to lose politically. These factors add up to a strong presidential advantage in the appointment process.
…
While many regard the president’s appointment market power as appropriate, I do not. Strong rule of law requires that laws be enforced as evenhandedly and as free of agenda as possible. The task of the executive branch is to carry out the law, not to make policy. The president’s latitude in appointing who he wants, gives him the power to shape policy by appointing people with shared policy objectives to executive agencies, influencing policy not by changing the law, but by changing the enforcement of the law. The power of the president to appoint judges who are particularly sympathetic to the executive branch acts to amplify the power of the president to shape policy.
Med andre ord vil han gerne have, at konceptet om magtens tredeling rent faktisk overholdes, som det forudsættes i den amerikanske forfatning. Lidt anderledes er det selvfølgelig i parlamentariske demokratier som i Danmark og UK, hvor vi ikke har en tredeling af magten som sådan. F.eks. er det nok de færreste der (som jeg selv) mener at det er forkert at man både kan være folketingsmedlem og minister på samme tid. Rent faktisk kan man i Danmark både være folketingsmedlem, højesteretsdommer og justitsminister på samme tid; hvilket blot understreger det et af de mere absurde elementer i vores forfatning.
Tilbage til historien: Indlægets forfatter er sur over den måde hvorpå lovgivningen og udøvelsen falder sammen. Derfor har han skrevet en ny artikel:
Den anden artikel hedder A competitive appointment institution og giver et lille bud på, hvordan man kan begrænse især præsidentens dominans på markedet for politiske udnævnelser: Istedet for at have én præsident og én kongres, skal man indføre én lovgivende kongres og én udøvende.
Umiddelbart leder det selvfølgelig tankerne hen pÃ¥ et andet, nu heldigvist ødelagt system, hvor man ogsÃ¥ havde en kongres der lovgav og sÃ¥ en centralkomité der udførte – men ideen i dette nye eksempel er ikke helt sÃ¥ hjernedødt:
The legislative congress would act much like contemporary non-parliamentary legislatures. All non-foreign policy related executive appointments would be filled by the candidate who is first to pass both congresses much in the same way as bills are passed now by the House and Senate. All executive branch positions (besides the actual executive congress) would be filled either by appointment or hired directly or indirectly by an appointee. Only the executive congress would have the authority to remove an appointment for non-criminal reasons, and it would have to do so by a heavy majority. Federal judgeships would also be filled by appointment, but would only be removable by regular criminal proceedings for corruption and other crimes.
The goal of having both congresses approve appointments would be to select consistently centrist executives with strict respect for rule by law (not necessarily rule of law). The job of the executive congress would be to make sure that executive appointees are not beholden to the legislative branch; to give appointment positions. The job of the legislative congress in the appointment process would be to make sure that executive appointees are interested in evenhanded enforcement of the law. Heavy majority requirements for passing both congresses would work to make sure that appointments are very centrist so that enforcement of the law would remain relatively constant through time. Competition between representatives in the congresses for influence on appointment results would make appointments relatively quick.
…
My primary concern with this system is that I am not sure if the executive congress would try to strengthen the power of the executive branch in opposition to the legislative branch’s attempts to strengthen itself, because I am not sure it would have enough vested interest in the executive branch.
Den sidste passage siger jo det hele. Men ikke desto mindre synes jeg, at dette er en vidunderlig frisk måde at se tingene an på.
Iøvrigt har bloggerne også fået skrevet sig et nyt lille indlæg om, hvorfor de selv mener, USA har en tredeling af magten.
